





Housing the Russian middle class 
 
Abstract 
The chapter examines the housing situation of the middle class, in comparison to other groups 
within Russian society. The analysis begins with a qualitative study of government housing 
policy since the early post-socialist period. It demonstrates that policy measures were not class-
targeted, yet had important implications for people residing in accommodation of different 
qualities and locations and for households with different compositions. The chapter proceeds 
with a quantitative analysis of the SDMR and GKS-KOUZH-2016 survey data. The analysis 
reveals that the middle class was slightly better-housed compared to the working class in the 
objective (having a housing unit of their own and the availability of housing space per person), 
but particularly in the subjective (feeling a lack of space and the self-reported physical state of 
a housing unit) senses. The study also demonstrates that the middle class was more active in 
buying and constructing new housing, and in the use of savings, capital (mostly, existing 
housing) and mortgage credit to finance those activities. The inequality between classes, at the 
same time, was less pronounced in terms of what was defined as the ‘objective’ quality of 
housing, ownership structure, and the use of funding made available through the Maternity 
Capital programme. The study, overall, demonstrates that while policies were not class-




The objective of this chapter is to determine what it means to be middle class in contemporary 
Russia in terms of housing.i As elsewhere in this volume, we rely on the definition of the middle 
class based on the professional status and educational characteristics set out in the work of 
Markku Kivinen (2020: 43, Li et al 2013) and adopted throughout this volume. As people 
experience housing as households, rather than individuals – although there exist single-person 
households – in this chapter we refer to pure middle-class households, working-class 
households, but also mixed class households, where a family consists of representatives of the 
middle and non-middle classes. Our analysis applies a quantitative methodology and uses the 
SDMR survey data, also used by other contributions to the volume. In addition, we supplement 
the SDMR data with the GKS-KOUZH-2016 survey, which contains complementary data 
related to the housing class structure in Russia. For the SDMR survey we use the KivinenClass 
variable and for the GKS-KOUZH-2016 we construct a proxy variable based on educational 
and professional status which corresponds to the KivinenClass variable.  
Certain aspects of the housing process – such as home ownership and the use of personal 
finance – are often ascribed as features of middle-class behaviour. In this chapter, we consider 
these and other characteristics associated with the housing sphere of the Russian middle class. 
We also compare the middle class to the strata who do not fit into this category, namely the 





Housing tenure type and the use of credit are only some of the aspects of the housing situation 
of the middle class which we analyse in this chapter.  
In Section 1, we review the housing policy of the Russian Government over the past three 
decades in order to establish which other elements of the housing process we need to pay 
attention to in order to determine the housing circumstances of the middle class in Russia. We 
focus on policy measures directly affecting the housing conditions of the Russian people at the 
time of writing. These include housing privatization, the liberalization of utility prices, the 
introduction of mortgage borrowing and different measures of social support for specific 
household categories in the housing sphere. Government policy has created institutional 
structures which have had a varied impact on housing conditions and generated different 
housing strategies among different strata of Russian society. Section 2 presents our analysis of 
the SDMR and GKS-KOUZH-2016 survey data. We concentrate our attention on such aspects 
as home ownership, quality of housing and subjective housing satisfaction, the use of housing 
finance, different strategies for improving housing conditions, and attitudes towards the 
housing sphere and the provision of housing services. The analysis also considers the difference 
in class housing conditions across different types of settlement (cities, towns, and villages) in 
Russia and the provision of housing with housing utilities and durable goods between different 
household types.  
Housing policy in Russia in the post-Soviet period 
Since the demise of state socialism and economic planning, the housing situation of the Russian 
people has been profoundly affected by the emergence and development of a free housing 
market, new commercial housing construction, the introduction of mortgage finance, and 
increased migration flows both within the cities and towards large urban centres, notably 
Moscow and St Petersburg. The depths and speed of housing changes that have occurred in 
Russia – as well as in other post-communist countries – and the profound role of government 
policy in these changes means that the statement by a housing scholar that the ‘state makes the 
market’ (Clapham 2019) is certainly highly poignant in the context of this transformation.  
Government policy was important in initiating and further shaping the political, economic, and 
social processes associated with housing transformation. Key reform measures in the early 
1990s followed the neo-liberal ideology, and included the transfer to the municipal authorities 
of public housing ownership and management functions, the free privatization of state-built 
accommodation to sitting tenants, the liberalization of housing maintenance and utility supply, 
and the introduction of the system of home-mortgage lending (Khmelnitskaya 2014, 2015, 
Zavisca 2012). These changes were part and parcel of the wider economic restructuring and 
transformation of Soviet-era enterprises and the divestiture of their social responsibilities, 
including that for housing provision, towards different levels of state administration, 
predominantly local and regional. Housing privatization initiated in Russia by the Law on 
Housing Privatization of 4 July 1991 followed earlier tentative steps towards housing 
privatization during the years of perestroika in the late-Soviet period (Khmelnitskaya 2015). 
The process of housing privatization was gradual in character. By 2000, 60% of 
accommodation eligible for privatization had turned to private ownership. The remaining 40% 
continued being municipally managed and rented to social tenants. Among those households 
which did not privatize, many perceived no immediate benefits of home ownership. For 





immediate and tangible profits from selling their apartments. By contrast, those who resided in 
elite blocks of flats located in prestigious areas of capital cities could turn hefty profits by 
selling their apartments at market prices. Furthermore, many Russians were concerned by the 
‘dangers’ of private ownership, including the potential higher tax burden, and the responsibility 
for costly maintenance and major repairs (kapital’niy remont) of their blocks of flats. The costs 
associated with the latter were particularly concerning. Much of the housing stock was in bad 
need of repair and the new owners were to bear the costs.  
The socio-economic context of the transition period in the 1990s was important. The sharp 
reduction of incomes and the loss of savings due to galloping inflation resulted in a situation 
where the housing sector played the role of a ‘shock absorber’. This related not only to give-
away privatization, which transferred significant housing wealth to individual households, but 
also to the housing utilities and to maintenance costs that were kept at artificially low levels. 
The opposition to the Government’s neo-liberal plans, first in the Supreme Soviet, and then in 
the State Duma, prohibited sharp increases in housing and utility costs being charged to the 
users. Such increases, the opposition argued, would have resulted in mass non-payments 
because of the lack of the population’s disposable income: in 1992-93 up to 33% of the 
population lived below the poverty line.ii The number of the poor gradually diminished to 21% 
by 1997 but peaked again at 29% in 1999-2000. In the second half of this chapter we examine 
the attitudes towards housing and utility services among the Russian middle class as well as 
other groups. We consider the complex question of whether the legacy of the social provision 
of housing and utilities during the Soviet period, paired with the experience of artificially low 
housing charges in the 1990s, resulted in the expectation of free or heavily subsidized provision 
of these goods by the state among Russians by the mid-2010s.  
In the 1990s, the parliamentary opposition continued to block the adoption of a new Housing 
Code involving a more far-reaching change in the regulation of the housing sphere. The 
advocates of the liberal reforms were committed reformers within successive Russian 
governments under President Yeltsin and their international advisors. Among the most 
contested issues were the already mentioned responsibility for the costs of major housing 
repairs and the extent of the state’s responsibility for the provision of social housing. The 
introduction of such changes was awaiting a more amenable political situation. This emerged 
with Vladimir Putin’s arrival in power in 2000. The election of the United Russia-dominated 
executive-friendly lower house of parliament at the end of 2003 meant that the State Duma 
finally voted for the government’s version of the Housing Code at the end of 2004 
(Khmelnitskaya 2015). The code was adopted simultaneously with the infamous monetization 
of social benefits, greeted with widespread protests by pensioners. The fact that the adoption 
of the new radical neo-liberal Housing Code did not attract a comparable amount of popular 
criticism – apart from some critical commentary from the expert community – can be explained 
from the perspective of political science. This was a case where the potential losers from the 
reform did not perceive how the reform could disadvantage them and were insufficiently 
organized anyway, whereas those who gained from the introduction of new policy mechanisms, 
particularly a group of determined neo-liberal policy-makers, saw ‘a window of opportunity’ 
opening for them with the emergence of the parliamentary majority and pushed through the 
policy change (see Gel’man and Starodubtsev 2016). The reduction in the state commitment 
on the provision of public housing to the 5% of the population on the lowest incomes, and the 





owners, also promised considerable savings of state budget funds. In practical terms, prior to 
the adoption of the 2004 Housing Code, all households residing in dwellings with floor space 
below a socially guaranteed norm (of 10 square metres in Moscow and 9 in St Petersburg,iii 
while it differs across the regions) could be placed on municipal housing ‘waiting lists’. After 
the Code came into force, the principle of means-testing was applied. Thus, only the households 
on the lowest incomes and living in overcrowded housing were entitled to receive social 
housing.  
Where the state left off, the market was expected to take over. The system of mortgage finance 
was introduced in Russia in 1996 with the establishment of the Agency for Home Mortgage 
Lending (AHML) (Khmelnitskaya 2014). At the time of its introduction, mortgage loans were 
expensive and accessible only to the highest earners. Nonetheless, housing wealth which 
Russian families received in the process of housing privatization could be used to improve their 
housing conditions. The combination of housing privatization with the gradual development of 
mortgage finance and the simultaneous withdrawal of the state from the social provision of 
housing signified the establishment of the ‘paradigm’ of predominantly private home 
ownership. Housing finance started developing more steadily in the 2000s as economic 
performance improved and household incomes started to grow. Its development was held back 
to an important extent by the underlying weakness of the Russian banking sector. Nevertheless, 
by 2016 30% of housing transactions were financed with the use of mortgage loans. The figure 
was at its highest in the Moscow region, at 80% (Khmelnitskaya 2017a).  
Overall, housing privatization, the developing housing market, and the introduction of 
mortgages have entirely transformed the Russian housing sphere and ownership structure. By 
2017, according to Rosstat data, 81% of the housing stock that was eligible for privatization 
had been privatized (Rosstat 2019), and 91.5% of housing was held in private ownership,iv 
creating a nation of ‘super-home-ownership’. The continuing weakness of the Russian banking 
industry, however, had another important implication for the housing sector. Due to the lack of 
alternative investment options, housing became a prime destination for investment, allowing 
citizens to store value in the form of ‘investment apartments’. Respectively, many owners of 
second and further apartments chose to rent those out to return some of the investments made. 
In addition, the ownership of several housing units was also a result of intergenerational 
property transfers, when children and grandchildren inherited property from older family 
members. An important aspect was that the investment and rental attractiveness of housing 
varied by region. Moscow especially, but also St Petersburg and Sochi, were cities with high 
migrant inflows (Burdyak 2017). Thus, in the early 2010s these regions offered the highest 
returns on investment and realised the highest house prices. 
The role of the state in providing social housing and related benefits displayed significant 
regional variance, too. The provision of social housing became the responsibility of the regions. 
The regions continued to maintain housing waiting lists, infamous since the Soviet era 
(Attwood 2010). However, what happened to those placed on the lists depended on the 
financial resources of a given region. The provision across Russia remained low. Only 5% of 
households on waiting lists were allocated social housing in 2017, or 122,000 out of 2,458,000 
families in needv (Rosstat 2019). Federal policy prioritized large families, those with 
disabilities, and orphans leaving institutional or foster care. Yet, in the majority of cases any 
significant change to the housing circumstances of those placed on the waiting lists resulted 





individuals, particularly young families, taking action with regard to their housing situation 
using the market mechanisms available (Bogomolova and Cherkashina 2018). As far as the 
‘non-priority’ groups were concerned, the regional authorities aimed to promote market 
housing while offering a certain degree of social assistance. An example of such initiatives was 
the ‘social mortgages offered with city support’ in Moscow, starting from the mid-2000s. 
Moscow, being one of Russia’s wealthiest regions, could afford such social assistance for home 
purchases. By contrast, other, less affluent regions, particularly under conditions of severe 
budget scarcity in the mid-2010s (see Zubarevich et al. 2017), tended to put off the provision 
of social housing, leaving it to natural causes or private initiatives to take care of individual 
housing needs.  
Against this background, from the second half of the 2000s onwards, experts and everyday 
citizens alike began to express their discontent with the highly limited availability of housing 
options. The key problem concerning the vast majority of Russians was that they were not rich 
enough to afford market prices but not sufficiently poor to expect any form of housing 
assistance from the state. They essentially represented the housing affordability gap. In the 
opinion of many, the situation deteriorated even in comparison with the Soviet period, which 
was notorious for its housing shortages and time spent on housing waiting lists.  
This perception coincided with growing concern about Russia’s demographic outlook, gaining 
momentum in the mid-2000s following the agenda set out in the 2005 Presidential Address to 
the Parliament (Putin 2005). In addition, research has underlined the subjective association that 
the Russian people, as well as those in other East European nations, make between their 
housing circumstances and their ability to form a family and have children (see Zavisca 2012). 
Policy emphasis on housing affordability – particularly among young families – therefore, 
stemmed from a combination of factors, including growing popular dissatisfaction, leadership 
priorities, and subjective cultural perceptions. Thus, in the late 2000s and after we have 
observed a number of new measures being introduced, such as the Corporation (Fund) for 
Housing Repairs, the Corporation (Fund) to Assist New Housing Construction, the National 
Affordable and Comfortable Housing Project, and the Maternity Capital initiative introduced 
in 2007 (Khmelnitskaya 2017a, b, Grishina and Tsatsura 2018) and various measures to provide 
subsidized mortgages for families with children. For instance, the ‘children’s mortgages’ 
(detskaya ipoteka) introduced in 2018 was designed for families with a new-born child at a 6% 
interest rate for 3 to 8 years and at a reduced rate for the rest of the lending period (see Burdyak, 
Lyashok and Maleva 2018: 63-5). 
The Maternity Capital was a large lump-sum benefit to any mother who had a second child. 
The size of the Maternity Capital was 453,000 rubles in 2016-2018 (PFRF 2018a). However, 
its purchasing power varied, depending on the region. Taking into account the house price 
difference between the regions, this sum of money was more significant in the provinces with 
lower house prices, as opposed to hyper-expensive Moscow and St Petersburg. Although, 
according to its regulations, the sum that the programme distributes for the birth of the second 
child can be invested in the mother’s pension savings, the child’s education, or disability 
rehabilitation, the majority of those who have received and used the Maternity Capital 
certificate – 91% or around 5 million families (PFRF 2018a) – have used it to improve their 
housing conditions: 3.3 million have used the money to take out or repay a mortgage loan. In 





gives the overall number of recipients of the Maternity Capital certificate by 2018 as 8.9 million 
households (PFRF 2018b).  
Other measures included attempts to promote rental accommodation. The importance of the 
development of affordable commercial (as opposed to social) rental housing types was 
reflected in many policy documents of the late 2000s and the early 2010s, for example the State 
Programme on Housing adopted in April 2014 (Gossudarstvennaya programma 2014). 
However, the results of this policy were less than encouraging, primarily because the local 
authorities and the construction industry lacked incentives to develop this type of housing 
(Khmelnitskaya 2017a). Moreover, the change in the economic context in the mid-2010s 
affected the housing and mortgage markets. With the drop in the value of the ruble in 2014, 
housing prices in many Russian regions have stagnated or decreased (Maleva 2017). The 
continued new housing construction further added to the supply side of the market. 
Consequently, housing lost its investment attractiveness (ibid) and the proportion of the 
demand fuelled by investment motives by and large disappeared. This produced a situation in 
the rental market with plenty of availability of new investment apartments in large cities. In 
smaller towns, by contrast, private housing rent was rather affordable – cheap in fact. Some 
pensioners provided rental accommodation, often a room, at a price that simply allowed them 
to cover their communal service charges. 
Besides, as the housing privatization that had been underway since the early 1990s was made 
permanent in February 2017 by an amendment to the 2004 Housing Code (Khmelnitskaya 
2017c), this decision affected local governments’ incentives to develop social housing. Such 
housing could at any time ‘be lost’ to privatization. As a result, by the late 2010s, housing 
privatization was described by many observers as an obstacle constraining further balanced 
development of the housing sphere in Russia (e.g. Artem’ev 2019). 
Finally, policy-makers continue with the measures to liberalize the Russian housing sphere. 
Through the 2000s and 2010s, efforts continued to increase housing and utility service (HUS) 
charges. In 2011-2013 the users covered 90% of the HUS costs, the rest being subsidized from 
the budget. In 2016-2017 the figures were 94.3% and 95.5% respectively. Non-payments were 
low: in 2017 just 4.3% (Maleva 2018). This was nearly negligible compared to the level of 
non-payments in the 1990s.  
Overall, during the early post-Soviet period and in the 2000s liberalization was the key 
development in the Russian housing sphere. Over this period, private ownership of housing 
climbed to 91.5%. Government policies, however, were not class-targeted. The targeting that 
occurred was addressed towards families with children, an emphasis connected to demographic 
concerns rather than class inequality. 
 
Housing the middle class: analysis of the SDMR and GKS-KOUZH-2016 survey data 
In this section we examine the housing situation of the Russian middle class, and by implication 
other groups within Russian society. Essentially, we ask: what does it mean to be middle class 
in Russia in terms of housing? Our analysis includes such characteristics as objective and 
subjective living conditions, ownership structure, different strategies to improve housing 
conditions, the use of Maternity Capital, timely payments for housing and communal services, 





between cities, towns, and villages and how the housing conditions of different class groups 
differ in terms of their provision with utilities and certain durable goods. 
Two sources of data are used: the SDMR survey – which is used by other contributors to this 
volume – and the GKS-KOUZH-2016 survey conducted by Rosstat.vi From the SDMR data 
we examine three waves of the survey: 1998, 2007, and 2015. The SDMR contains a number 
of questions addressing the housing situation of Russian households. Particularly relevant 
questions include those on the type of the dwelling, floor space per household, receipt of 
Maternity Capital, and attitudes towards the housing sphere. These allow us to make important 
observations about the housing situation of the Russian middle class and its comparison with 
other segments of society. Yet, in order to present the reader with a broader picture of the 
housing characteristics of the middle class in Russia, we supplement the SDMR with Rosstat’s 
Comprehensive Monitoring of Living Conditions 2016 survey (GKS-KOUZH-2016). A few 
words on this data source are in order. The GKS-KOUZH-2016 covers 60,000 Russian 
households, or 135,000 people, and is representative of all the population. Weighting is applied. 
We constructed a proxy for the Kivinen middle-class indicator based on the profession code 
ISCO and the presence of higher education. Our proxy variable, therefore, corresponds with 
the Kivinen_Class08 variable used for analysis by other contributors to the present volume. 
Further, as noted, given that people live in housing as households, we cannot consider housing 
as an individual characteristic, thus we need to construct household categories. Therefore, 
individual Kivinen middle-class indicators were aggregated into a household variable. If all 
working members of a household belong to the middle class, we classify the household as a 
middle-class household (15.5%). Likewise, a household belongs to the working class (47.2%) 
if all employed members of such a household are classified as working class. Finally, 
households with both types of employees are called ‘mixed type’ (11.5%). The rest of the 
sample consists of non-working families (25.8%). Most in this category are retirees. See Figure 
1.vii  
 
Figure 1 – Household distribution by strata, % 
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Objective and subjective housing conditions of Russian households  
We begin with the objective living conditions of the Russian middle class. By ‘objective’ we 
understand those results expressed in numerical indicators, for instance having a housing unit 
of their own and the quantity of housing expressed in square metres, which are considered 
below. Later this sub-section moves on to ‘subjective’ housing characteristics based on 
individuals’ self-reported perceptions of the lack of housing space they are experiencing and 
the self-assessed quality of their housing. In other words, the ‘subjective’ is about perceptions 
and feelings. 
The objective housing conditions of the middle class and the other strata of the adult population 
in Russia can be assessed using several waves of the SDMR survey and its question on the type 
of the housing unit. In 1998 and 2007 surveys we can identify whether the person lives in their 
own house; a one, two, three, four, or more roomed apartment; in a communal apartment; in a 
dormitory; in barracks; or in a rented apartment. In the 2015 survey, the number of rooms in 
the apartment was left out of the questionnaire, therefore in the dynamic analysis for 1998-
2007-2015 we aggregate one, two, three, four, or more roomed apartments in one category 
designated ‘apartments’. An important point to be mentioned is that we consider communal 
apartments, dormitories, and barracks as poor housing conditions. They are aggregated into a 
single category. Fortunately, the data shows that not too many working people reside in such 
housing: from 3% to 6% in different years. See Figure 2.  
Figure 2 – Type of housing of the core and margin of middle-class and working-class 
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Source: Calculations on SDMR data, Sdmr_mergewithKivinenClass_spss.sav 
 
As the data shows convincingly, the main type of housing condition in the Russian Federation 
is an apartment in a block of flats. Among all working people surveyed in the SDMR 67% in 
1998, 73% in 2007 and 70% in 2015 lived in apartments. Their own house is the residence of 
25% in 1998, 17% in 2007 and 23% in 2015. The increase in the number of households residing 
in apartments observed in 2007 must be due to a shift in the sample toward apartment residents, 
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Table 1 – Type of housing of core and margin of middle-class and working-class individuals 
for 1998-2007-2015, % 
  











































































































































Own house 23.2 19.8 25.8 23.5 15.0 17.5 18.0 17.1 21.7 21.2 26.6 24.6 
Block of flats 72.2 73.0 67.3 70.2 75.7 74.8 71.0 73.2 70.4 69.9 64.4 66.6 
Rooms in a communal apartment 1.2 2.7 2.5 2.1 2.2 1.7 2.6 2.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 
A room in a hostel 0.4 1.3 2.3 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.8 
Rooms in barracks 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.7 
Communal apt., hostel, barracks 
(subtotal) 
1.5 4.4 4.9 3.8 2.9 3.1 3.5 3.2 5.2 5.9 6.1 5.9 
Rent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 3.5 4.3 4.1 1.4 2.1 2.3 2.1 

























Source: Calculations on SDMR data, Sdmr_mergewithKivinenClass_spss.sav 
 
Our main interest, however, is the difference between the overall distribution of working people 
across types of dwelling and that of the middle class. Is the middle class better off in terms of 
having a housing unit of their own? The data demonstrates that the core of the middle class is 
certainly better-housed: fewer of its members do not have a separate place to live, residing in 
communal apartments, dormitories, and barracks. The margin of the middle class, by contrast, 
looks just slightly better off than the working class. Yet, the gap is too small to be considered 
a significant disparity between these two groups. Another important observation is that the core 
and margin groups of the middle class tend to be housed in blocks of flats, whereas a larger 
proportion of the working class reside in individual houses. This difference can be explained 
by the fact that the middle class tends to be urban and gravitates towards larger cities, where 
individual houses are rare, whereas a greater proportion of the working class reside in smaller 
towns and rural areas with a larger share of individual housing buildings.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this point. While in large cities (one million inhabitants and more) 
25% of households belong to middle class people, in cities with 100,000-249,000 inhabitants 
the share of the middle class is 17%. In rural settlements 5-8% of inhabitants belong to the 
middle class. This is largely determined by the structure of the labour market and the 
availability of middle-class jobs in different settlement types. The predominance of apartment 
housing or individual houses in urban and rural areas is also contingent on external factors, 







Figure 3 – Household distribution by type of settlement, % 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
Figure 4 – Type of dwelling by type of settlement, % 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
The next ‘objective’ characteristic of the housing situation of the Russian middle class is the 
quantity of housing space per person. This characteristic is also often referred to as 
overcrowding. Table 2 and Figure 5 present the per-capita aggregate space of a house or 
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surveyed by SDMR-2015viii is comparable to the square metres per person reported by the 
Russian statistical service, Rosstat, for 2015-2016, also included in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Mean and median aggregate space of houses or apartments by strata, sqm. per capita 
  Mean Median 
Core of the middle class 21.9 18.3 
Margin of the middle class 21.5 17.5 
Working class 19.8 16.7 
All working people 20.8 17.5 
SDMR-2015, total 22.1 18.7 
Rosstat, 2015 21.7   
Rosstat, 2016 22.8   
Source: Calculations on SDMR-2015 data and Rosstatix 
 
The data show that the core of the middle class enjoy greater housing availability compared to 
the working class. The difference between these strata is 2.1 sq. m in mean and 1.6 sq. m in 
median values. The margin of the middle class, at the same time, is somewhere between those 
two groups. Overall, similarly to the first characteristic of having a housing unit of their own, 
the Russian middle class on average is better off in terms of the availability of the housing 
space per person compared to the working class (see Figure 5). Non-employed people, 
especially pensioners, have more spacious housing in per-capita terms – this is the reason why 
the total average SDMR figures are higher than those for the working people sub-sample. 
Figure 5 – Mean and median aggregate space of a house or apartment by strata, sq.m. per capita 
   
Source: Calculations on SDMR-2015 data 
 
Yet, a closer look at the distribution of per capita housing space in intervals reveals that it is 
the core of the middle class that has the greatest housing availability across the whole 
distribution. It perhaps appears somewhat surprising that among the margin of the middle class 
group a greater proportion in comparison to the working class reside in overcrowded housing 
(up to 9 sq. m and 9-11 sq. m) (see Figure 6). This could be because many in this group are 
families with small children or young specialists with good educations and job positions who 
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the chance to move to better housing. It is also noteworthy, however, that for the intervals from 
15 sq. m. and higher we find more representatives of the margin of the middle class having 
greater housing space availability compared to that of the working class. 
Figure 6 – Per capita space of a house or apartment by strata in intervals, % 
  
Source: Calculations on SDMR-2015 data 
In order to examine the subjective – i.e. based on individuals’ self-reported perceptions and 
feelings about their housing conditions – characteristics of the housing conditions of the 
different strata in Russia, we turn our analysis to the GKS-KOUZH-2016. This data presented 
in Figure 7 demonstrates that, according to personal perceptions, the house or flat was too small 
for 10% of the working class and 6% of the middle class. Another 22% of the working class 
and 20% of the middle class felt some constraints in terms of housing space availability. The 
problem of small dwellings was most acute for the mixed type of households. By definition, 
they comprise two individuals or more, while the three other categories contain a certain 
proportion of single-person families. As a rule of thumb, the bigger the family, the more likely 
it is to face a lack of housing space when compared to those living alone.  
Figure 7 – Households experiencing lack of space in their main dwelling by strata, %
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Another subjective characteristic relates to the personal assessment of the physical condition 
of the housing units. Here we get 6% excellent, 45% good, and 44% satisfactory responses 
across all households (Figure 8). This shows, that based on individual perceptions, Russian 
housing is in a rather good physical state overall. Nevertheless, 5% of households live in bad 
or very bad dwellings. The difference between the middle and working classes is striking: 61% 
of the former reside in good or excellent dwellings and 2% assess their homes as being in a bad 
or very bad condition. By contrast, among the latter, only 48% reside in good or excellent 
dwellings, while 6% report their bad or very bad physical state.  
 
Figure 8 – Personal assessment of the physical condition of the dwelling by strata, % 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
Looking through the prism of the type of settlement, the data reveals the problem of the bad 
physical conditions for different classes to be the most severe in smaller settlements. Across 
all settlement types – cities, towns, and villages – representatives of the middle class are better 
off in terms of the physical condition of their flats or houses. See Figure 9. 
Figure 9 – Bad dwellings by strata and type of settlement, % 
 


























































































































































Physical condition of the dwelling is bad or very bad (by personal 
assessment) 







On the contrary, smaller accommodation is more prevalent in big cities. Figure 10 shows that 
the problem is more acute for mixed and working-class households across the board, but 
especially in larger urban areas. The non-working households, mostly pensioners, experience 
the least overcrowding, as the data show. In this case, the middle class is also better off 
compared to the working class in terms of overcrowding across all settlement types. 
 
Figure 10 – Feel cramped in dwelling by strata and type of settlement, % 
 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
At the end of this sub-section we consider the dimension of housing comfort related to the 
provision of housing amenities and durable goods. The most common communal convenience 
is electricity. It is accessible for almost all respondents of the SDMR. There are several 
households ‘without electricity’ in the 2007 data, but other records demonstrate that these 
people watch TV and use other electric appliances, which would be impossible to do with no 
electric supply. Thus, we consider these cases as record errors. See Figure 11. About 60% of 
housing is equipped with basic communal facilities: running cold water, sewage disposal, 



































































































































Feel very cramped in accommodation 










As argued above, class difference in terms of the size of housing is small. Yet, as far as home 
utilities are concerned (see Table 3), in 1998 the margin of the middle class lived in the most 
comfortable houses or apartments. For the core of the middle class, the share of housing with 
access to the main communal services was 60% in 1998 and 73% in 2007. The working class 
lived in less comfortable conditions: 56% of its representatives in 1998 and 60% in 2007 lived 
in homes equipped with all the basic communal facilities. The difference has increased, but can 
we attribute it to the manifestation of class privilege? Access to basic utilities is largely an 
endogenous characteristic. As we have demonstrated before, the housing stock in large cities 
mainly consists of apartment buildings, which are connected to utilities. On the contrary, 
central heating is rare and impractical in rural areas. Since 24% of the working class lives in 
rural areas and 76% reside in cities and towns, but only 17-19% of the middle class live in 
villages and 81-83% in urban settlements, it is the urban/rural distinction that fundamentally 














































Electricity 99 99 99 99 100 100 99 100 
Central heating 70 73 65 67 77 72 71 73 
Cold water running 87 90 83 85 93 90 89 90 
Sewage 79 81 71 75 85 80 79 81 
Hot water running 52 61 52 53 63 57 52 56 
Gas in the kitchen 68 72 72 71 76 73 69 72 
Gas heating for water  22 20 18 19 19 24 18 20 
Individual gas heating 17 14 15 15 15 18 18 17 
Fixed-line telephone 64 66 51 56 71 63 61 64 
Elevator 24 27 25 25 23 16 22 21 
Garbage removal  20 25 23 23 23 17 23 21 
Cable TV         31 26 25 27 
Internet         23 13 10 14 
Main communal services 60 65 56 58 73 68 60 65 
 
Again, elevators and garbage removal are strongly associated with living in a block of flats – 
there is no great difference between middle- and working-class housing in the equipment by 
these communal facilities. At the same time, as Table 4 illustrates, the use of Internet and cable 
TV display high class differences: 23% of the core of the middle class and 10% of the working 
class have the Internet at home. Cable TV is available to 31% of the core of the middle class 
and 25% of the working class. Equally, as far as available household appliances, equipment, 
and durable goods are concerned, it can be observed that a more modern and high-tech life 
style is a characteristic of the middle class. This supports the findings of Li et al (2013: 360-
361) that the middle class is widely involved in computer usage. According to the SDMR-2007 
data, 54% of the core of the middle have computers, 47% have hi-fis, 49% have microwaves, 
and 90% have mobile phones. Among the working class the shares are lower: 34% for 
computers, 34% for hi-fis, 38% for microwaves, and 77% for mobile phones.  
 
Table 4 – Household appliances, equipment and property, % by strata 
  
1998 2007 c o r e o f t h e m i d d l e c l a s s m a r g i n
 
o f t h e m i d d l e c l a s s w o r k i n g
 
c l a s s A l l e m p l o y e d
 
A l l c o r e o f t h e m i d d l e c l a s s m a r g i n
 
o f t h e m i d d l e c l a s s w o r k i n g
 
c l a s s A l l e m p l o y e d
 



































TV 98 98 97 97 97 98 97 98 98 98 
Satellite 
TV 0 0 0 0 0 10 3 2 4 4 
Video or 
DVD tape 
recorder 52 51 47 49 40 76 71 64 69 59 
Camcorder 8 5 2 4 3 32 20 17 22 18 
Hi-fi 24 28 19 22 18 47 37 34 38 31 
Mobile 
phone 3 2 1 2 1 90 81 77 81 71 






r 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 2 2 
Microwav
e 11 9 4 6 5 49 43 38 42 36 
Washing 
machine 88 84 85 85 81 89 86 82 85 82 
Refrigerat
or 97 96 97 97 96 96 95 94 95 94 
Vacuum 
cleaner 86 77 78 80 74 91 84 82 85 80 
Good 
furniture 34 28 26 29 24 53 41 41 44 39 
Summer 
cottage 38 33 24 29 27 30 25 23 25 24 
Apartment 45 43 35 39 38 66 65 64 65 63 
Car 49 40 34 38 32 53 45 39 44 36 
 
Table 4 also shows that the representatives of the upper strata more often own expensive items 
of property such as a car or a summer cottage. In 2007 53% of middle-class people owned cars, 
and 30% dachas. For the working-class stratum, the share of car-owners was significantly 
lower, at 39%. Only 23% of working-class families owned a summer cottage. Yet, the class 
difference was negligible with respect to the most basic household appliances, including 
washing machines, refrigerators, and TVs. 
To summarize, our analysis concerning the objective and subjective characteristics of the 
housing conditions of the Russian households by class reveals that the middle class is 
somewhat better-housed compared to the working class in the objective (having a housing unit 
of their own and availability of the housing space per person), but particularly, in the subjective 
(feeling a lack of space and the self-reported physical state of the housing unit) senses. The 
provision of most basic utilities is more primarily determined by the settlement type than by 
household class characteristics. Nonetheless, the middle class is more likely to own modern 
goods and services, such as computers, and have Internet access, as well as expensive items 
such as cars and dachas. 
 
Tenure structure, policy impact, market practices, and attitudes 
In this section, we consider aspects of the housing situation of the Russian middle class as the 
structure of housing ownership, including ownership in different types of settlements, and the 
uptake of the Maternity Capital. We will also consider the strategies used by Russian families 
belonging to different classes for changing their housing conditions. Our particular interest here 
is the question of to what extent different classes within the Russian society have internalized 
market practices. We also ask about the discipline with which different groups pay their utility 
bills and the attitudes they have towards the housing sphere.  
The GKS-KOUZH-2016 data allows us to judge the extent of home ownership among different 
classes. The highest proportion of owners is among non-working households. Most of these 
are pensioners (Figure 12). There is a high level of home ownership in the mixed group, and 
86% of the working class and 88% of the middle class own their homes. The difference between 










Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
On average 12% of middle-class households and 14% of the working class do not own their 
dwellings. Across different types of settlements, home ownership among the middle class is 
higher than that of the working class by 1-6 percentage points. See Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 – Non-ownership of dwellings by strata and type of settlement, % 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
From home ownership, we move to the Maternity Capital policy, which many Russian families 
have used to move to a new house or flat. Did the respondents of the SDMR survey receive 
















































































































































Household is not an owner of its main dwelling





as argued earlier in this chapter, is a policy with no obvious attachment to a recipient’s class 
position. Every mother, as a citizen of the Russian Federation, has a right to receive the benefit 
if she gives birth to a second child during the period of the programme. The first reading of this 
data, however, may suggest that this policy, nonetheless, favours middle-class families. While 
about 18% of all working people in SDMR-2015 claimed that their household received a 
Maternity Capital certificate, the figures for the core and margin of the middle class were over 
20%, whereas for the working class this was only 15%. Given that the policy is not class-
targeted, the only explanation for such a difference may lie in the lesser eligibility of the 
working-class sub-sample. Consideration of the age differences in the sub-groups offers a 
plausible explanation. Indeed, the working-class stratum is younger than the middle class (see 
Figure 8) and 27% of the working-class people in the SDMR-2015 are under 30. For some of 
them the birth of a second child, and, thus, the Maternity Capital entitlement, are things to 
come. 
 
Figure 14 – Age distribution by strata, % 
 
 
Source: Calculations on SDMR-2015 data 
 
As argued in our policy survey in Section 1, Maternity Capital allows families with children to 
move to more suitable housing. However, the need and intention to move cannot be considered 
as exclusive to families with children. How many Russian families by strata have the intent to 
move house? It was already noted that as a rule, mixed households tend to experience a lack of 
housing space and thus have a greater need for more spacious housing. Figure 15 demonstrates 
that this indeed is the case, while in both middle- and working-class strata the intent to change 
housing conditions is the same, 16%. On average the share of households who intend to move 
makes up only half of those facing some or an acute lack of housing space. This is true for the 
working-class and mixed families. The middle class shows more active intentions to move 
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Figure 15 – Assessment of physical condition of the dwelling by strata and intention to change 
housing, % 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
The strategies which different classes among the Russian people consider using in connection 
to their plans to move to a new house are worth noting. Analysis of these strategies offers a 
way to ascertain attitudes towards market practices as well as the reliance on government 
welfare among Russian people. Different strategies that strata intend to use in the next two to 
three years are presented in Table 5. The middle class is twice as likely to be planning to move 
into new housing already under construction (3.5% of the middle class and 1.8% working class) 
and more likely to be planning a house purchase (7.2% of the middle class and 5.2% of the 
working class). A significantly smaller percentage of Russians rely on state social assistance 
in improving their housing situations. Only 0.9% of the middle class and 1.3% of the working 
class had the intention to join a housing waiting list in 2016. Another 0.3% of the middle class 
and 0.6% of the working class expected to receive new accommodation allocated according to 
the demolition programmes. Although the numbers are not high, they demonstrate that housing 
strategies involving state social assistance are more prominent among the working class. The 
middle class, on the contrary, is more likely to rely on market mechanisms. 
 









adults All hh 
Intend to change housing conditions in the next 
2-3 years using the following strategies: 15.9 19.2 16.2 4.3 13.4 
Plan to move into new housing which is already 
under construction 3.5 3.6 1.8 0.2 1.9 
Plan to apply to be placed on a housing waiting 
list 0.9 1.4 1.3 0.3 1.0 
Expect to receive new housing according to the 
demolition programme 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 
Plan to buy / build more housing (including 
exchange) 7.2 7.9 5.2 0.5 4.6 
Plan to rent house / apartment 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 
Plan to improve housing conditions using other 
strategies 3.6 5.1 6.4 2.6 4.8 
 





















Middle class Mixed type Working class Non working adults All households
Intend to change housing conditions in the next 2-3 years
Bad or very bad phisical condition of dwelling
Are really cramped in accommodation






It can also be pointed out that the intention to buy or build a new home, which involves selling 
the current apartment or house, is a rather ‘natural’ market-based strategy to improve housing 
conditions across all strata. Nearly half of all those intending to move among the middle class 
(7.2%) and a lesser proportion – about a third – of the working class (5.2%) chose this strategy. 
Renting a house or an apartment remains rather unpopular – 0.3% among middle-class and 
0.6% among working-class households. 
 
As far as the financing of a new house purchase was concerned, for those intent on moving in 
the next two to three years (those expecting to receive social housing or an inheritance are not 
included) the results are shown in Table 6. Among the 16% who had the intention to improve 
their housing conditions, a quarter of middle-class households (4%) and only half of that figure 
for working-class families (2%) were planning to take out a mortgage. The figure was higher 
for mixed households. Nearly a third of those planning to move to new accommodation (5%) 
in the mixed households category were considering a mortgage loan. Plans to use Maternity 
Capital were approximately similar for the middle and working class (under 1.5%). At the same 
time, the middle class relied more on their own capital and savings (3%) compared to the 
working class (2%). Thus, based on this data we would argue that the Russian middle class to 
a certain degree has started to display typical middle-class behaviour in relation to finance, 
which includes financial prudency, savings, and the use of credit.  
 
Table 6 – Intended sources of finance for the purchase/construction of a house/flat in the next 










adults All hh 
Sale of existing housing to buy another 3.1 2.7 1.7 0.2 1.6 
Mortgage loan 3.8 4.6 2.3 0.1 2.2 
Maternity Capital 1.3 1.6 1.4 0.1 1.1 
Means of military accumulative system 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Housing subsidy 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Other sources (including own funds) 2.9 2.9 1.9 0.2 1.7 
Hard to answer 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
This observation is further confirmed when we consider housing development behaviour. The 
GKS-KOUZH-2016 survey allows an examination of the practice of new housing 
development. At the time of the GKS-KOUZH-2016 survey, 3% of the middle class were 
involved in the construction of an apartment and 1% were building a detached house (Table 7). 
The working class, by contrast, was less likely to be involved in construction. Then, 2% of the 
middle class took out credit loans; for the working class the figure was 0.8%. From Table 7 it 
is also evident that the middle class was more relying on their own capital or savings (3%), 

















adults All hh 
New construction of:           
apartment in an apartment building 2.5 2.0 0.6 0.1 0.9 
residential house (part of house) 1.2 2.2 1.3 0.2 1.1 
house on garden (country) plot, 'dacha' 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 
other place for permanent (seasonal) residence 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Finance for construction:           
credit 2.0 2.3 0.8 0.1 1.0 
Maternity Capital 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.5 
savings and/or other capital 2.9 3.0 1.4 0.3 1.5 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
To summarize what has been said so far in relation to the intent to improve the housing 
situation, while market practices certainly appear as the most common strategy across the 
board, they also represent a more pronounced strategy among the middle class. We, therefore, 
would generally support the argument put forward in Gunko et al. (2018: 300) that most home-
buyers are middle class, yet with one qualification. This may be the case in the city of Moscow 
where Gunko et al.’s study was conducted. Across the entire country, however, representatives 
of all strata purchase and build new housing. Still, there are more representatives of the middle 
class among those who buy and build housing.  
 
Another factor which we consider below and which both demonstrates the proliferation of 
market practices among different strata, as well as being an indication of their material well-
being, is payments for housing and utility services. The middle class again emerges as a more 
disciplined group. About 15% of all households said that they had missed payments for housing 
and communal services at one time or another due to lack of income (see Figure 16). Among 
the middle class, 9% reported that they had had such arrears, including 5% who did not pay on 
time twice or more. For the working class the problem was significantly more severe: 18% 
failed to pay on time at one point, including 11% who had arrears at least twice during the last 
year before the survey. 
 
Figure 16 – Arrears in payment of housing and communal services due to lack of money by 
strata, % 
 
































Another category of housing payments is rent and mortgage payments. These are not as 
prominent in our sample: 87% of the working class and 86% of the middle class did not have 
such payments at all (Figure 17). Nevertheless, 2.4% of working-class families had arrears in 
rent and mortgage payments in the year preceding the survey. Among the middle class, at the 
same time, 1.6% households failed to pay on time.x  
 
Figure 17 – Arrears in rent and mortgage payments for the main home due to lack of money 
by strata, % 
 
 
Source: Calculations on GKS-KOUZH-2016 data 
 
We conclude this section with an analysis of the attitudes held by the different strata among 
Russian society towards the housing sphere. The SDMR survey data in their three waves of 
1998-2007-2015 presents a rather complex picture. At first glance, the results presented in 
Figures 18 and 19 are striking. The SDMR data demonstrate that since 1998 – while about 5% 
of SDMR respondents found this question difficult to answer – most people in all strata (88-
92%) continued to believe that the authorities should be responsible for providing housing and 
communal services. There are notable developments in the data too. During the considered 
period, the area of the regional authority’s responsibility grew from 8% to 20% of the opinion. 
Federal responsibility increased from 43% to 50% of the responses in 2007 but decreased to 
39% in 2015. In the 2000s, the working class was relying slightly more on the federal 
authorities and less on the municipalities than the middle class. Nevertheless, municipal 
responsibility was the most popular answer for all strata to the question about communal 
services provision. Overall, distinctions between strata were not crucial. Thus, the majority of 
Russians, by and large regardless of their class position, appeared to entrust the state and its 
different administrative layers with providing housing and communal services. Personal 





































Figure 18 – How many strata representatives think in 1998-2007-2015 that local, regional or 
federal levels of authority should run communal services, % 
 
 
Figure 19 – How many strata representatives think that citizens themselves or private 
companies should run communal services in 1998-2007-2015, % 
 
 
This distribution of answers seems to offer support for a stereotypical perception of Russians 
as holding paternalistic values, distrusting the markets and reluctant to take on personal 
responsibility. These attitudes could, moreover, be attributed to the legacy of the socialist 
welfare model and the post-Soviet transition in the 1990s when, as explained in Section 1, the 
public was charged a mere fraction of their housing and utility costs. At the time of writing, 
this interpretation may be reinforced by such occurrences as the pensioners’ movement 
observed in some locations in Siberia peculiarly termed the ‘Born in the USSR’ trade union.’xi 
The organizers of this movement claimed that its members abide by Soviet laws, which made 
them exempt from paying commercial prices for utilities and housing services. Although not 
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constituting a mass movement by any means, such instances suggest that some groups among 
the Russian public may in fact still expect the state to provide housing and utilities at negligible 
prices.  
 
We, however, would like to challenge this view, first by pointing out that such an interpretation 
would stand in stark contrast to what has been demonstrated earlier in this section. Russian 
people pay their maintenance and utility bills in full, even if with occasional delays, which 
were rare in any case at only 15% of observations. Across all groups, households were more 
reliant on market mechanisms when considering improving their housing conditions. The 
expectations that state social assistance could help them out in this were significantly lower. If 
so, what is going on with the survey data?  
 
In solving this puzzle, it is important to point to the difference in the question formulation 
between different waves of the SDMR survey. In the 1998 questionnaire, the question referred 
primarily to the responsibility for ‘housing’ among other services. In 2007 and in 2015 the 
question was: ‘Who should run communal services?’ i.e. mainly about the provision of 
communal services. The common attitude among the majority of the Russian public that they 
prefer the state to provide various social services is well acknowledged in the literature (for 
instance Kulmala et al. 2014). However, as to why Russian people hold such attitudes, we 
suggest that in respect of housing and utility services the respondents might have interpreted 
the question primarily in terms of responsibility for monitoring the quality and guaranteeing 
the prices of service provision.  
 
The distribution of answers between the levels of state authority also speaks in favour of this 
interpretation. In Russia, opinion polls continually show that the most trusted institution in the 
country is the President.xii However, as far as housing is concerned most people put their trust 
in the municipal level, whereas the share of regional trust has increased at the expense of both 
the federal and municipal trust levels. The regional level may be seen as increasingly important 
because it can provide checks over municipal behaviour in terms of utilities and housing 
services provision more effectively than the federal authorities. There have been cases, 
particularly around the time of the third wave of the SDMR in 2015, when municipalities put 
up communal charges at rates exceeding inflation, in order to ease the pressure on their budgets. 
Such instances provoked popular protests, as for example in Novosibirsk, where the public 
demanded the regional governor put pressure on the misbehaving municipalities.xiii Given that 
the growth of housing and utility charges in the mid-2010 was outstripping price growth for 
other goods and services, it is perhaps unsurprising that these charges represented an area of a 
particular concern for the public (see Sinel’nikov-Murylev and Radygin 2018: 326-333).  
 
Conclusion 
The first part of the chapter examined Russian housing policy since the early 1990s. It was 
argued that this policy was dominated by the liberal approach, which aimed to increase personal 





nevertheless, was also complemented by a group of measures to support vulnerable groups and 
particularly families with children. However, there was no apparent targeting of policies to 
specific class groups. The analysis of the policy initiatives in the first section laid the basis for 
the examination of the survey data in the second part of the chapter.  
The central question for this part was what it means to be middle class in contemporary Russia 
in terms of the housing situation. Our analysis has shown that in certain areas – particularly in 
the quality of housing, the use of credit, constructing different types of housing and buying 
housing, the use of savings and capital (mostly, existing housing) to finance new house 
purchases – a difference between classes was observed. The middle class was also more 
disciplined in making timely payments for housing services. The inequality between classes, 
at the same time, was less pronounced in terms of what we defined as the ‘objective’ quality 
of housing, ownership, the use of Maternity Capital, and attitudes to housing. The difference 
in housing between urban and rural areas was determined by labour market conditions rather 
than attributable to class disparities. Overall, then, while the liberalization of housing was the 
objective of housing policy, as argued in Section 1, the inequality that is usually associated 
with neo-liberalism increased insignificantly. This is due to the legacy of housing provision 
during the socialist period and the policy of free housing privatization, which was not class-
targeted. Low levels of housing mobility in Russiaxiv further helped to conserve a relatively 
egalitarian housing structure. Nonetheless, emerging class differences, especially in terms of 
financial behaviour and involvement in new housing development, can be regarded as 
important. Therefore, we conclude that while housing privatization was the central policy 
measure introduced in the 1990s that defined the development of the Russian housing sphere 
for decades, class structuration in this sphere is emerging, a trend which may be expected to 
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